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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF THE PRESS-DISTRIBUTION OF HAND-
BiLLS-[United States].-The Supreme Court of the United States recently
reviewed together four cases involving local ordinances which either totally
prohibited distribution of handbills in designated areas" or permitted dis-
tribution only after the securing of a permit from the chief of police.
2
Held, that municipalities may not exercise their police power to abridge an
individual's constitutionally guaranteed freedom to impart information
through the distribution of non-commercial literature.
In recent years there has been a significant increase in ordinances pro-
hibiting or restricting the distribution of handbills.3 Although the majority
of these ordinances do not specify motives and are confined to the restric-
tion itself,4 others are passed, or are sustained, under the authority of the
police power to prevent the frightening of horses,5 the littering of streets,6
the creating of fire hazards, 7 the clogging of sewers,8 or the perpetrating
of fraud.9 It is settled law that such ordinances may constitutionally be
applied to commercial advertising,'0 but there has been a definite split of
authority concerning the treatment of non-commercial literature." The
United States Supreme Court, in Lovell v. Griffin (1938),12 definitely estab-
lished the principle that the freedom of the press guaranteed in the First
Amendment of the Federal Constitution against federal action is embodied
as well in the Fourteenth Amendment and so applies to municipal ordinances
1. Young v. California, Snyder v. Milwaukee, Nichols v. Massachusetts
(1939) 60 S. Ct. 146.
2. Schneider v. New Jersey (1939) 60 S. Ct. 146.
3. (1937) 5 Internat'l Juridical Ass'n Bull. 147.
4. Ibid.
5. Wettengel v. Denver (1895) 20 Colo. 552, 39 Pac. 343; People v.
Armstrong (1889) 73 Mich. 288, 41 N. W. 275; Philadelphia v. Brabender
(1902) 201 Pa. 574, 51 Atl. 374.
6. People v. St. John (1930) 108 Cal. App. 779, 288 Pac. 53; Wettengel
v. Denver (1895) 20 Colo. 552, 39 Pac. 343; People v. Armstrong (1889)
73 Mich. 288, 41 N. W. 275, 2 A. L. R. 721, 16 Am. St. Rep. 578; Almassi v.
Newark (C. P. 1930) 8 N. J. Misc. 420, 150 At]. 217; Philadelphia v.
Brabender (1902) 201 Pa. 574, 51 Atl. 374; Milwaukee v. Kassen (1931)
203 Wis. 383, 234 N. W. 352.
7. In re Anderson (1903) 69 Neb. 686, 96 N. W. 149, 5 Ann. Cas. 421;
Milwaukee v. Kassen (1931) 203 Wis. 383, 234 N. W. 352.
8. See cases cited supra note 7.
9. Schneider v. New Jersey (1939) 60 S. Ct. 146; Maplewood Township
v. Albright (C. P. 1934) 13 N. J. Misc. 46, 176 Atl. 194; Dziatkiewicz v.
Maplewood Township (1935) 115 N. J. Law 37, 178 AtI. 205.
10. San Francisco Shopping News Co. v. South San Francisco (C. C. A.
9, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 879; People v. St. John (1930) 108 Cal. App. 779, 288
Pac. 53; Sieroty v. Huntington Park (1931) 111 Cal. App. 377, 295 Pac.
564; Allen v. McGovern (Sup. Ct. 1933) 12 N. J. Misc. 12, 169 At. 345;
People v. Horwitz (1912) 27 N. Y. Cr. 237, 140 N. Y. Supp. 437. See
Schneider v. New Jersey (1939) 60 S. Ct. 146; Coughlin v. Sullivan (1924)
100 N. J. Law 42, 126 Atl. 177; People v. Johnson (Ct. of Gen. Sess. 1921)
117 N. Y. Misc. 133, 191 N. Y. Supp. 750.
11. Note (1923) 22 A. L. R. 1484; Note (1938) 114 A. L. R. 1446.
12. (1938) 303 U. S. 444.
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restricting leaflet distribution.13 An ordinance prohibiting the distribution
of handbills at any point in a city without a pemnit from the city manager
was held to establish a censorship which violates the due process clause in
abridging the freedom of the press.
Attempts were made to distinguish the instant cases from Lovel V.
Griffin on the ground that the restrictions were limited to designated areas, 14
or were manifestly enacted to prevent the littering of streets15 or fraudu-
lent solicitation.16 The court, in rejecting these distinctions, followed the
view that courts should examine the effect upon freedom of speech and press
of challenged ordinances "to appraise the substantiality of the reasons ad-
vanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights."'?
Such a judicial technique casts upon the courts the problem of deciding
what kind of handbill should receive protection as non-commercial literature
of opinion. It has been held that the handbills need not be distributed
gratuitously1 8 and that the constitutional protection covers expression of
religious opinions,19 presentation to the public of the contentions of picket-
ing trade unionists,20 solicitation of membership in trade unions,21 criticism
of governmental bodies and agencies by groups of citizens,2 2 the advertising
of social affairs and meetings of non-commercial organizations,23 and pro-
13. Cf. Gitlow v. New York (1925) 268 U. S. 652; Stromberg v. Cali-
fornia (1931) 283 U. S. 359; Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U. S. 697;
Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936) 297 U. S. 233; DeJonge v. Oregon
(1937) 299 U. S. 353.
14. Young v. California, Nichols v. Massachusetts (1939) 60 S. Ct. 146.
15. Snyder v. Milwaukee (1939) 60 S. Ct. 146.
16. Schneider v. New Jersey (1939) 60 S. Ct. 146.
17. Schneider v. New Jersey (1939) 60 S. Ct. 146, 151. A different test
was presented in In re Anderson (1903) 69 Neb. 686, 96 N. W. 149, 150,
5 Ann. Cas. 421: "The test in such cases is whether the regulation in ques-
tion is a bona fide exercise of the police power or an arbitrary and unseason-
able interference with the rights of individuals under the guise of police
regulations." Quoted with approval in Milwaukee v. Kassen (1931) 203
Wis. 383, 234 N. W. 352.
18. Lovell v. Griffin (1938) 303 U. S. 444; Schneider v. New Jersey
(1939) 60 S. Ct. 146.
19. Lovell v. Griffin (1938) 303 U. S. 444 (Jehovah's Witnesses);
Schneider v. New Jersey (1939) 60 S. Ct. 146 (Jehovah's Witnesses). Con-
tra: Coleman v. Griffin (1936) 55 Ga. App. 123, 189 S. E. 427 (Jehovah's
Witnesses); Dziatkiewicz v. Maplewood Township (1935) 115 N. J. Law 37,
178 Atl. 205; Semansky v. Common Pleas Ct. (Sup. Ct. 1935) 13 N. J.
Misc. 589, 180 Atl. 214; Maplewood Township v. Albright (C. P. 1934) 13
N. J. Misc. 46, 176 Atl. 194.
20. Snyder v. Milwaukee (1939) 60 S. Ct. 146.
21. Rochester v. Parr (City Ct. of Rochester 1937) 165 N. Y. Misc. 182,
1 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 771.
22. Nichols v. Massachusetts (1939) 60 S. Ct. 146; Coughlin v. Sullivan(1924) 100 N. J. L. 42, 126 Atl. 177, where the majority of the handbills
were distributed in stores and only one or two upon the streets.
23. Young v. California (1939) 60 S. Ct. 146 (Friends Lincoln Brigade);
People v. Armstrong (1889) 73 Mich. 288, 41 N. W. 275, 2 L. R. A. 721,
16 Am. St. Rep. 578 (Y. M. C. A.). Contra: Commonwealth v. Kimball(Mass. 1938) 13 N. E. (2d) 18, 114 A. L. R. 1440 (Play sponsored by
I. L. G. W. U.).
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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
tests of groups of citizens against activities inimical to their interests.2 4
Furthermore, ordinances of these types may not be directed against limited
groups such as non-residents 2. or members of the Industrial Workers of
the World.2 6
Unfortunately, the Court in the instant cases indicates a method whereby
the distribution of leaflets might be indirectly curtailed. The littering of
streets may be prevented by punishing "those who actually throw papers
on the streets."2 7 Such circuitous restrictions of the freedom of the press
might well have the effect of direct total prohibition, since they might cause
potential recipients to refuse to accept any handbills. Other indirect attacks
have been made by punishing distributors of leaflets under the guise of dis-
orderly conduct, loitering, breach of the peace, or other well recognized cate-
gories of offenses. 28 Taking their cue from these indirect methods, municipal
legislative bodies bent on the curtailment of literature distribution may be
inclined to enact circuitous restrictions which will have the effect of pro-
hibition.29
The decision in the instant cases is a definite step forward in the pro-
tection of civil liberties, but the dictum in the opinion indicates that freedom
of the press, as exercised in the publishing and distributing of handbills,
remains subject to a degree of control3o and that the exigencies of local or
24. People v. Johnson (Ct. of Gen. Sess. 1921) 117 N. Y. Misc. 133, 191
N. Y. Supp. 750 (National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People protesting pro-Ku Klux Klan moving pictures).
25. Elgin v. Winchester (1921) 300 Ill. 214, 133 N. E. 205, 22 A. L. R.
1481 (fee and bond required); Nutley v. Brandt (Sup. Ct. 1934) 12 N. J.
Misc. 670, 174 Atl. 244 (non-resident required to pay a fee, to be finger-
printed and photographed).
26. Ex parte Campbell (1923) 64 Cal. App. 300, 221 Pac. 952 (ordinance
prohibiting distribution by Industrial Workers of the World).
27. Schneider v. New Jersey (1939) 60 S. Ct. 146.
28. (1938) 7 Internat'l Juridical Ass'n Bull. 30, 32, n. 15.
29. After Chicago v. Schultz (1930) 341 Ill. 208, 173 N. E. 276, voided
an ordinance totally prohibiting leaflet distribution on the streets as being
an unreasonable interference with private rights, the ordinance was amended
to prohibit distribution of handbills 4 " x 6" or longer, except that such
handbills "may be distributed from hand to hand if not tossed or thrown,
if enclosed in envelopes or folded or otherwise handed out in such a man-
ner as to avoid the likelihood of falling while being passed out" (Chicago
Code of 1931, sec. 4281 as amended). Wettengel v. Denver (1895) 20 Colo.
552, 39 Pac. 343, upheld an ordinance which prohibited distribution of hand-
bills of such a character that the recipients would naturally or probably
throw them in the streets. In this case, recipients were requested not to
drop them in the streets, and circulators endeavored to pick up such hand-
bills as were thrown away. The case went off on error of the trial court
in not submitting the case to the jury.
30. This control includes certain well-recognized situations in which there
is a clear and immediate danger of violent overthrow of the state or in
which the handbills contain obscenity, libel, or undisputed invasions of the
right of privacy. But, also, in times of imagined crises there are shifting
definitions in the interpretations affecting the rights of handbill distribu-
tors. Under the pretense of prohibiting the activities of alleged subversive
groups, legitimate freedom of the press can be distorted or destroyed. Pos-
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national conditions may lead the courts to validate extended indirect inva-
sions of the immunities contained in the Bill of Rights. Subsequent decisions
will reveal whether this undesirable possibility will be actualized.
J. R. S.
CORPORATIONS-IERGER-RIGHT OF HOLDER OF CUMULATIVE PREFERRED
STOCK TO ACCRUED DIVmENDS-[Delaware].--A corporation, by vote of
91.8% of its total stock, adopted a plan to merge with its wholly owned
subsidiary. Under the plan one share of $3 cumulative preferred stock and
six shares of no par value common stock in the new company were to be
exchanged for each share of the old $6 cumulative preferred stock and $29
accrued, unpaid dividends. The parent corporation had at the time a sur-
plus, unearned but available for dividends, which was more than sufficient
to pay the accumulated preferred dividends. This surplus was to be capital-
ized and given to the preferred stockholders. Delaware statutes existing at
the time the corporation was created authorized the merger of parent cor-
poration with subsidiary and the adoption of a plan for converting the stock
of the old corporation into that of the new.1 Such a plan had to be adopted
by a two-thirds vote of all stockholders and all "rights of creditors * * * all
debts, liabilities and duties" and "all the restrictions, disabilities and duties
of each" were to survive against the resulting corporation.2 The plaintiffs,
holding shares of the old $6 cumulative preferred stock, brought a bill in
equity to have the merger declared void insofar as it would convert their
stock into other securities without paying the accrued dividends. Held, that
the merger statute, which was automatically a part of the contract between
stockholder and corporation, authorized two-thirds of the stockholders at
any time to effect a merger and to alter, under a fair and equitable plan, the
rights of preferred stockholders to accumulated unpaid dividends as well
as to future preferences. Plaintiffs were also held to be barred by laches. 3
The court's task was to construe the merger statute to determine whether
the legislature had intended to foster mergers to the extent of allowing the
corporation to make a fair and equitable adjustment of existing claims by
commuting accrued dividends into common stock rather than compelling
literal compliance with the terms of the stock contract.4 In previous cases,
where the changes had been attempted under a statute authorizing charter
amendments, the same court had refused to allow abrogation of the right
to preferred cumulative dividends already accrued, but did allow it as
sible unpredictable judicial action serves only to emphasize that the courts
cannot be relied upon as the bulwark of civil liberties and that preservation
of civil liberties fundamentally rests upon the vigilance of the citizenry
acting through the legislature.
1. Del. Revised Code (1935) sees. 2091, 2091A.
2. Del. Revised Code (1935) sec. 2092.
3. Federal United Corp. v. Havender (Del. 1940) 11 A. (2d) 331.
4. Literal compliance with the terms of the contract would require pay-
ment of all accrued dividends before any other class of stockholders might
participate in profits.
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